It is stated in Pesachim (21b): "Hezekiah said, 'From where do we derive that leaven on Passover, which is prohibited for benefit? As it is said (Exodus 13:3), 'No leaven shall be eaten,' there should be no allowance for its consumption. The reason that the Merciful One wrote 'no leaven shall be eaten' is that He did not write 'shall not be eaten'; I would have said that it implies prohibition of consumption but not of benefit. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, for Rabbi Abbahu said, 'Every place where it says 'shall not eat,' 'you shall not eat,' 'you shall not eat' — both prohibition of consumption and prohibition of benefit are implied, until the verse specifies as it does with regard to nevelah (carcass).'"

And indeed, the simplicity of the verse indicates prohibition of consumption, that one should not eat leaven on Passover. However, Hezekiah learned from the change in the vocalization of the passive form of the verb, 'shall not be eaten,' that the prohibition includes benefit as well. And Rabbi Abbahu accepted that every language of prohibition of consumption includes prohibition of benefit. Thus, leaven on Passover falls under the prohibitions of benefit, similar to an ox stoned [as a sacrifice to an idol], idolatrous worship, libation wine, a decapitated calf, and diverse kinds of vineyard.

In the matters we are about to discuss, we will endeavor, with the help of Heaven, to delve into the sources of this law and to define this prohibition correctly.

And let us begin with that which is stated later (24b): "Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, 'For all Torah prohibitions, one is not flogged except for consuming them in the manner they are normally eaten.' For what purpose? Rav Shimi bar Ashi said, 'For what purpose? To exclude what? Rav Shimi bar Ashi said, 'To exclude that if one ate raw fat, he is exempt.' Some say, Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, 'For all Torah prohibitions, one is not flogged except for deriving benefit from them in the manner they are normally enjoyed.' For what purpose? Rav Shimi bar Ashi said, 'For what purpose? To exclude that if one placed the fat of a stoned ox on his wound, he is exempt, and all the more so for eating raw fat, from which he is exempt.'"

And it should be investigated whether the first statement refers only to prohibitions of consumption that do not include prohibitions of benefit, so that there is exemption if they are consumed not in their normal manner, but if they also include prohibition of benefit, one is liable for the benefit derived from this consumption, due to the prohibition of benefit therein, or whether exemption from consumption not in its normal manner also applies to the benefit derived from this consumption.

And from the straightforward language of the statement, it emerges that the exemption applies only to consumption, but not to benefit. For it explicitly states: "For all Torah prohibitions, one is not flogged except for consuming them in the manner they are normally eaten," and this language includes all prohibitions, both prohibitions of consumption and prohibitions of benefit. And regarding the subsequent statement, "For all Torah prohibitions," and its clarified intention, it refers to both prohibitions of consumption and prohibitions of benefit. Therefore, if the first statement, which uses the same type of language, was also intended for something that includes both prohibitions, it must have been intended for something that includes both prohibitions.

This is also implied by Rashi, who explained: "One is not flogged except if one consumed them in the manner they are normally eaten." At first glance, why did Rashi need to add to the simplicity of the Gemara? Rather, it is evidently to emphasize that the exemption applies only to the prohibition of consumption, but one is still liable due to the prohibition of benefit, because one transgresses the prohibition of benefit whether it is in its normal manner or not.

According to this, clarification is needed. For it is understandable that regarding the subsequent statement, it is assumed that anything that is not normally consumed is exempt from both consumption and benefit. However, concerning the initial statement, what is the reason and source for the distinction between prohibitions of consumption, for which one is exempt if not in its normal manner, and prohibitions of benefit, for which one is not exempt from this?

There are two possible explanations:

A. In a straightforward manner, when the Torah explicitly states a prohibition of consumption, eating in the human manner is included in its words, and we have no basis or reason to extend the prohibition to consumption not in its normal manner. Even if there might have been a logical argument to include consumption not in its normal manner in the prohibition, the straightforward language of the verse does not support such an interpretation, and hence we have no source to prohibit it. However, regarding the prohibition of benefit, which is only hinted at in the verse and not explicitly stated, there is no limitation implied by the verse to benefit not in its normal manner. Therefore, the prohibition applies to benefit in any case, whether in its normal manner or not.

B. In a deeper manner, the distinction between the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition of benefit is that in consumption, the act of eating is prohibited, not just the actual act of consumption. Thus, anything not considered an act of eating is not prohibited by the Torah. Therefore, consumption not in its normal manner is exempt from punishment because it is not considered an act of eating. However, benefit is not related to actions but to existence, as it is about human enjoyment. Therefore, whether one enjoys something in its normal manner or not, the prohibition remains unchanged.

The subsequent opinion, which holds that there is no difference between the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition of benefit, and neither is punished if done not in their normal manner, argues that the prohibition of consumption is also due to its inherent enjoyment. The Torah used the language of consumption only because eating is the greatest, most common, and simplest form of enjoyment. But the essence and root of the prohibition of consumption stem from the enjoyment in it. Therefore, since we learn everything from the language of consumption, and from it we learn that we require it to be in its normal manner, then other enjoyments should also specifically require being in their normal manner.

Now, let's elucidate Hezekiah's words, who learned that leaven is prohibited for benefit from the verse "shall not be eaten," implying that there is no allowance for consumption. However, it seems necessary to clarify, as the prohibition of consumption is still mentioned, how do we infer the prohibition of benefit from it? Rashi explains this as follows: "There shall be no allowance that leads to eating, and usually, delights lead to eating, such as when one buys food with money." This teaches us from the change in language in the verse that not only is consumption prohibited, but every aspect and manner that leads to consumption is also included in the prohibition.

This is the interpretation understood by many later scholars and heads of yeshivas in Rashi's words. However, it seems reasonable to understand Rashi's language as merely suggesting that it is possible to imply and extend the prohibition of benefit from the language "shall not eat," but it remains a distinct prohibition and not part of the prohibition of consumption.

The first understanding we presented from Rashi's words is challenging because if, according to our understanding, the enjoyments are prohibited in and of themselves and are only hinted at in the language of eating because all enjoyments are implied in eating, then only enjoyments that lead to eating would be prohibited. This is difficult to accept. Perhaps their intention in understanding Rashi's words where he wrote "delights lead to eating" is that all enjoyments that are usually associated with eating are included in what he termed "delights." This means that all enjoyments associated with eating have a connection to eating, and this is the reason for their prohibition.

In any case, according to their words, it seems reasonable that since the Torah included the prohibitions of benefit in the language of consumption, as explained above, the prohibition of consumption is rooted in the enjoyment it brings. Therefore, when the Torah specified the prohibition using the language of consumption, it intended to encompass all enjoyments. Hence, we can understand that if one eats not in the usual manner, they are not punished for consumption. Nevertheless, there might still be room to obligate them for the benefit received from this consumption [see Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 5, Halacha 8, which elaborates on this]. However, it's difficult to attribute this intention to the first opinion we presented, as it used the language: "one is not flogged for consuming them except in their normal manner," implying no punishment at all. Yet, Mishneh Torah interprets it to mean that when the Torah exempted the eater not in their normal manner from punishment, it also exempted them from all consequences implied by this verse, including the benefit received from the consumption.

All of this we wrote according to the understanding of the first interpretation, that eating something not in its usual manner is not subject to lashes, but deriving pleasure not in its usual manner, even if not through eating, is subject to lashes. However, from Rashi's wording ("Some say"), it doesn't seem so, for his wording there is: "As Rabbi Abahu enjoyed, it was stated, and those who benefit are liable for benefit." It explicitly implies that the first interpretation does not include prohibitions on pleasure at all, neither directly nor indirectly, only prohibitions on eating, while the second interpretation refers only to prohibitions on pleasure.

According to this, it could have been suggested and stated that these two interpretations do not contradict at all. Instead, one sage said one thing and another sage said another, meaning, the first interpretation said there is no lashes for eating unless it is eaten in its usual manner, and the second interpretation said there is no lashes for deriving pleasure unless it is derived in its usual manner, and these agree with each other and do not disagree at all.

But truly, even though it seems to be implied by Rashi, it's difficult to say so, since all later scholars endeavored to reconcile the dispute between these two interpretations and found our words contradicting all their investigations and clarifications on this matter. And only in the Mishneh Lemelech did I find such an explanation, although he himself concluded that indeed, the two wordings were in disagreement, and Maimonides ruled in accordance with the second interpretation.

Furthermore, it's difficult to proceed in this manner, considering what is stated in the Talmud about the second interpretation: "For what reason? Rav Shimi bar Ashi said, for what reason? To exclude the case where if one placed the milk of a cow, which is to be stoned for being eaten, on its wound, that he is exempt, and certainly one who eats raw fat, which is exempt." It seems from the words of Rav Shimi that according to the second interpretation, there is more reason to exempt one who eats not in its usual manner than one who derives pleasure not in its usual manner. And if each interpretation is speaking about a separate matter, what relevance does the exclusion of eating have to pleasure? Surely, these are two different matters. And if, as we said, the two wordings do not contradict but each excludes something else, then what is all the more so? Eventually, both the prohibition of eating not in its usual manner and the prohibition of deriving pleasure not in its usual manner would diminish from the same source.

Indeed, according to those methods we mentioned earlier, according to the first interpretation, one who eats raw fat would be exempt from lashes on the eating side, but still liable for lashes on the pleasure side. Rav Shimi's words can be explained thus: that if one places raw fat on his wound, he is exempt according to the second interpretation because it is derived pleasure not in its usual manner, so all the more so he would be exempt from deriving pleasure from eating raw fat. And the explanation in this is simple, that what is considered placing raw fat on a wound not in its usual manner is only because most people use fat for other purposes, such as fueling lamps and tanning hides, but ultimately, the fat heals the wound, and from the perspective of the act itself of placing it on the wound, there is no change, and this action can be recommended as per the Mishnah (Avot Chapter 2, Mishnah 1), which is a credit to the doer and not a credit from others. Indeed, eating raw fat is considered not in its usual manner both from the perspective of the world's customs and from the perspective of the act itself, as there is generally no way to eat raw fat, so it turns out that it is neither a credit to the doer nor a credit from others, and therefore Rav Shimi said, if one places fat on the wound it is considered not in its usual manner because people do not customarily use fat for this purpose, but from the individual's perspective, there is not so much change in this action, so all the more so deriving pleasure from eating raw fat would not be considered in its usual manner, because the change in this is both from the world's customs and from the individual's perspective, as people generally do not do this.

According to the rulings, one who eats raw fat is exempt from lashes even for the pleasure derived from this eating. It can be explained as follows: raw fat inherently stands for pleasure, but a person can choose whether to use it in the way people usually do or not. However, raw fat is not intended for eating, and if one eats it raw, his eating is not considered eating either from the perspective of the person or the object at all. This is the explanation: if one is exempt for using raw fat not in its usual manner, even though raw fat inherently stands for pleasure, then certainly if he eats it, he should be exempt because it is not intended for eating at all.

And according to our explanation, we can understand the wording of Maimonides (Chapter 14 of the Laws of Forbidden Foods, 10-11) where he wrote: "All forbidden foods are not liable for lashes until one eats them for pleasure, except for meat cooked in milk and forbidden mixtures of the vineyard, because it was not stated about them eating, but rather another expression was used to prohibit their eating, in the language of cooking and in the holy language, to prohibit them even not in their usual manner of consumption. How so? If one curdles milk and eats it while it's hot until his throat is cleared, or if he eats raw fat, or if he mixes bitter substances, such as the head and the placenta, into sacrificial wine or into a pot of a carcass, and eats them when they are bitter, or if he eats forbidden food after it has become putrid and spoiled and unfit for human consumption, he is exempt. But if he mixes a bitter substance into a pot of meat in milk or into forbidden mixtures of the vineyard, and eats it, he is liable, and so on."

Now, it seems to need an explanation: why did Maimonides need to bring several examples of eating not in its usual manner, and not suffice with the first example, from which we could understand the others, as everything is included in eating not in its usual manner? What difference does this or that example make until he needed to specify each one separately? And the same applies to the last example, that he ate forbidden food after it became spoiled, this is also eating not in its usual manner, and apparently, even when the food starts to spoil, there is no longer a usual way for people to eat it, not just after it has completely spoiled.

Indeed, Maimonides' intention is to divide eating not in its usual manner into three types:

1. Boiled or raw fat, which is not fit for eating from the object's perspective until a change is made in it, such as cooling the boiled fat or cooking the raw fat, so such an eating action is not considered eating.

2. Sacrificial wine or carcass that is mixed with bitter substances, which are fit for eating from the object's perspective, but the person consumes them not in the usual manner of people, so this is eating, but not in the usual manner of people.

3. If the food has already spoiled, it has completely ceased from the category of food, and there is no meaning of eating it at all, neither from the perspective of the person nor from the perspective of the object.

According to our explanation, it emerges that indeed one who eats forbidden food close to spoilage will also be exempt, because there is no usual way for people to eat like this. And what Maimonides deduced to exempt specifically when the food has already spoiled is just to provide a third category and definition of eating not in its usual manner, namely in a way that completely nullifies the status of food.

And according to this, we can understand the "all the more so" in the Talmud, as mentioned, that is, regarding the raw fat, which inherently stands for pleasure, and if one uses it by placing it on a wound, this is similar to the second example brought by Maimonides, where one eats a good food but adds and mixes a bitter substance in it, as the food itself is fit for eating but the person eats it not in its usual manner, so certainly for one who eats raw fat, which its eating is not considered eating at all, he should be exempt, as there is no action of taking in this case.

According to what we discussed, several ambiguous points in our subject will be clarified. It is stated there further (Leviticus 22:2) in this language, and here is the law of uncircumcision, as the Merciful One said, "Uncircumcised males shall not eat" (Leviticus 19:23), and it was taught, "Uncircumcised males shall not eat" - I only have the prohibition of eating; whence [do I derive] that one should not derive benefit from it, should not use it as dye, and should not light a candle with it? Scripture teaches (Leviticus 22:25), "And you shall uncircumcise the uncircumcised," therefore. And the Tosafot wrote (s.v. "whence [do I derive] that one should not derive benefit"), and this is his language, and if you say, since it is evident to us that it is forbidden to derive benefit, why is it necessary to forbid dyeing and lighting? And R"i says, it is impossible in your opinion that dyeing is not considered benefit, because it is only a mere appearance, as it says in Bava Kama (110a) 'that matter itself', and so too lighting, it is impossible in your opinion that it is permissible since it is a way of burning, etc. And their words apparently need explanation, what difference does it make if through dyeing one benefits through mere appearance, ultimately they utilized the prohibition of uncircumcision in a practical manner of dyeing, and people benefit from the outcome, so why should we think that because the enjoyment comes from mere appearance it should be permissible to benefit in this manner?

According to what we have explained, it seems reasonable, as we have already explained, that the root of the prohibition of enjoyment is not the enjoyment itself, but the act of taking enjoyment, and if so, in enjoyment from mere appearance, there is a lack of the act of taking enjoyment, and it would not have been prohibited by the general prohibition of enjoyment that exists in uncircumcision. Therefore, the Torah needed to add a specific prohibition of enjoyment in uncircumcision, even in enjoyment that does not involve the act of taking it.

Indeed, even though our words are clear in explaining the words of the Tosafot, it is somewhat difficult linguistically because they wrote, and this is their language, and R"i says it is impossible that dyeing is not considered benefit, therefore. According to what we have explained, it would have been better for them to say 'that dyeing is not considered enjoyment', as the deficiency is not in the essence of the enjoyment, but in the one who enjoys, which is not considered his enjoyment like the act of taking enjoyment, and it requires further analysis. However, surely there is no objection that if uncircumcision were to become prohibited in dyeing, then the entire foundation we have established would be nullified, as the foundation of the prohibition of enjoyment is in the act of taking enjoyment, since here the enjoyment of mere appearance has been prohibited even though there is no taking. Because with regards to uncircumcision, it is a unique multiplication, and it does not apply to all prohibitions of enjoyment. And proof of this is that according to Rashi, even the act of lighting is included in the category of mere appearance, yet it required a special multiplication by itself. And it is evident that the Torah was more stringent regarding uncircumcision to prohibit even enjoyments that do not involve taking enjoyment.

According to what we have explained, we can explain the two opinions we brought above from the Mishnah to the king, whether the one who says that one is not lashed for eating not in its normal way, whether the one eating will be lashed for the enjoyment derived from the eating, or since the Torah exempted eating not in its normal way from lashes, the one eating is exempt from lashes altogether. Indeed, the opinion of those who believe that one is also exempt from the enjoyment of the food, and their reasoning is that if the Torah exempted this action of eating, it exempted it completely and did not obligate it from another aspect, however, their words still require explanation, because ultimately, the Torah did not exempt the enjoyment not in its normal way from lashes, and if so, for what reason is the one eating exempt from lashes for eating not in its normal way due to the enjoyment derived from the food.

Indeed, their words will be explained according to the principle we have established, that one is not obligated for the enjoyment itself, but for the taking of enjoyment, and therefore, since it is evident here in eating forbidden fat that there is no act of eating, as we have explained, if so, there is also no act of taking enjoyment, and the enjoyment itself does not obligate, and this is the intent of the Rash Joseph that one who eats forbidden fat not in its normal way does not enjoy from their eating, as they did not perform the act of taking enjoyment, and therefore they are not obligated even though they benefited in practice.